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RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN FAITH-BASED
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE WAKE OF
OBERGEFELL V. HODGES: BELIEVERS BEWARE
Charles J. Russo*
I.

INTRODUCTION

“[I]t’s certainly going to be an issue. I . . . don’t deny that. I
don’t deny that, Justice Alito. . . . [I]t is going to be an issue.”1

Solicitor General Donald Verrilli’s fateful words, uttered in
response to a question posed by Justice Samuel Alito during
oral arguments in Obergefell v. Hodges,2 likely sent chills up
the spines of leaders in faith-based educational institutions,
from pre-schools to universities. In Obergefell, a bare majority
* B.A., 1972, St. John’s University; M. Div., 1978, Seminary of the Immaculate
Conception; J.D., 1983, St. John’s University; Ed.D., 1989, St. John’s University;
Panzer Chair in Education and Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Dayton. I
extend my appreciation to Dr. Paul Babie, D. Phil., Professor of Law and Legal Theory,
Adelaide Law School, The University of Adelaide, Australia; Dr. David A. Dolph, Chair
of the Department of Educational Leadership in the School of Education and Health
Sciences, University of Dayton; Dr. Ralph Sharp, Associate Professor Emeritus, East
Central University, Ada, Oklahoma; William E. Thro, General Counsel and Adjunct
Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; and Professor Lynn D. Wardle, Bruce C.
Hafen Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University,
Provo, Utah for their useful comments on drafts of the manuscript. I would also like to
thank my Assistant, Ms. Elizabeth Pearn, for proofreading the manuscript and helping
to prepare it for publication. Finally, I would be remiss if I did not offer my greatest
thanks and love to my wife, Debbie Russo, a fellow educator serving as a pre-school
teacher, for proofreading and commenting on drafts of this article along with
everything else that she does in our life together, not just for me but also for our
children and grandchildren.
1
Transcript of Oral Argument, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)
(Nos. 14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574), 2015 WL 1929996, at *38. This same language is
cited in the proposed Federal First Amendment Defense Act:
Sec. 2 (3) Nevertheless, in 2015, when asked whether a religious school could lose
its tax-exempt status for opposing same-sex marriage, the Solicitor General of the
United States represented to the United States Supreme Court that “[i]t’s
certainly going to be an issue.”

H. R. 2802, 114th Cong. (2015), was introduced on June 17, 2015. For a more thorough
discussion of this proposed law, see infra notes 173 et seq. and accompanying text.
2
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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of the Supreme Court legalized same-sex unions in the United
States. Verrilli’s words, combined with the outcome in
Obergefell, have a potentially chilling effect on religious
freedom. The decision does not only impact educational
institutions—the primary focus of this article—but also a wide
array of houses of worship. Other religiously affiliated
institutions that may be affected include health and social
services agencies, such as those working with adoptions3 and
ministering to the needy.4 These educational institutions and
other agencies designed to assist the common good run the risk
of being shuttered as a form of punishment, to the detriment of
many, if they remain true to their faith—a decidedly unAmerican prospect.
As noted at the outset, Verrilli’s comment came in response
to a question from Justice Alito. Justice Alito inquired: “[w]ell,
in the Bob Jones case,5 the Court held that a college
was not entitled to tax-exempt status if it opposed interracial
marriage or interracial dating. So would the same apply to a
university or a college if it opposed same-sex marriage?”6
During the first oral argument in Obergefell, as part of a ninety
minute session on whether the Fourteenth Amendment
requires states to grant marriage licenses to two people of the
See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
See John Agnew, Deus Vult: The Geopolitics of the Catholic Church, 15
GEOPOLITICS 39, 47 (2010), http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/geog/downloads/856/391.pdf
(stating that the Roman Catholic Church is “the largest single supplier of health
services and education in the world.”). For example, 2014 data from a position
statement by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops revealed that “645
Catholic hospitals in the United States assist 87,972,910 patients annually; [o]ne in six
patients in the U.S. is cared for in a Catholic hospital; [t]here are over 19.5 million
emergency room visits and over 102 million outpatient visits in Catholic hospitals
during a one-year period; [and] [o]ver 5.2 million patients are admitted to Catholic
hospitals annually[.]”, Catholic Health Care and Social Services, U.S. CONF. OF
BISHOPS,
http://wwwmigrate.usccb.org/about/media-relations/backgrounders/healthcare-social-service-humanitarian-aid.cfm (last visited Feb. 9, 2016).
5
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (revoking the
university’s tax exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code, pursuant to which
individuals who donated money were entitled to tax deductions on their federal income
taxes, because its officials engaged in discriminatory admissions practices with regard
to race when they refused to admit African-Americans and forbade interracial dating,
based on the institution’s religious doctrine). For representative commentary, see
William A. Drennan, Bob Jones University v. United States: For Whom will the Bell
Toll?, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 561 (1985); Ralph D. Mawdsley & Steven Permuth, Bob
Jones University v. United States: A Decision with Little Direction, 12 EDUC. L. REP.
1039 (1983).
6
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at *38.
3
4
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same sex, Chief Justice Roberts addressed a related question to
the Solicitor General:
Counsel, I’d like to follow up in a line of questioning that
Justice Scalia started. We have a concession from
your friend that clergy will not be required to perform samesex marriage, but there are going to be harder questions.
Would a religious school that has married housing be
required to afford such housing to same-sex couples?7

Verrilli refused to answer the question directly, responding
instead that “issues are going to arise no matter which way you
decide this case, because these questions of accommodation are
going to arise in situations in States where there is no samesex marriage . . . and, in fact, they have arisen many times.”8
As noted in the opening sentence, this exchange raises serious
concerns for the future of not-for-profit faith based schools, and
other institutions that are admittedly beyond the scope of this
article. Such questioning is serious because it seems to reveal
governmental intent to punish believers for remaining faithful
to teachings they have accepted for ages.
As discussed below, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion is
bereft of constitutional analysis or grounding, particularly his
analysis of the substantive due process right to liberty and
equal protection. Even as he referred condescendingly to people
of faith, Kennedy ostensibly sought to allay concerns that the
imposition of same-sex unions on the United States via judicial
fiat would negatively impact believers who seek to exercise
their rights to religious freedom.9 As reflected by the stridency
of the dissenting Justices,10 Kennedy’s musings did little to
offer much in the way of protection for religious freedom. As a
consequence of these trivial musings, supporters of Obergefell
now hasten to enact legislation.11
Id. at *36.
Id. at *37.
9
See Brian Walsh, Religious Freedom After the Supreme Court’s Same-Sex
Marriage
Decision,
WASH.
TIMES
(D.C.)
July
1,
2015,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jun/30/brian-walsh-religious-freedomafter-supreme-courts/ (reporting that Obergefell “offers these Americans [of faith]
decidedly scant reassurance.”).
10
See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2642 (2015) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (voicing concern that Obergefell ”will be used to vilify Americans who are
unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy . . . by those who are determined to stamp out
every vestige of dissent.”).
11
See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
7
8
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Obergefell was handed down amid a growing body of actions
demonstrating hostility to religion, not all of which have been
litigated. The upshot of much of this activity is that it
evidences a great deal of antipathy for Christianity. The
attacks on Roman Catholicism in particular and its reverence
for the Eucharist as the Body and Blood of Christ12 reveal that
anti-Catholicism remains the “anti-Semitism of the
intellectuals” (and progressives).13 Incidents evidencing the
aforementioned trend have occurred both on and off campuses
in an attempt to restrict, if not eliminate,14 religious and other
forms of free speech15 at faith-based colleges and universities
with overt Christian affiliations as well as public educational
institutions.16 The goal of such concerted activities is
apparently to restrict the free flow of ideas ,especially those of
12
Members of the gay group ACT-UP chained themselves to pews in St.
Patrick’s Cathedral, shouted down Cardinal O’Connor at a Sunday Mass before others,
“received” Eucharist but spat it out, and desecrated the Sacrament by stepping on the
consecrated hosts. While conceding that the protestors such as these undoubtedly
represent a small fringe minority, this is a particularly egregious example and one can
only wonder what kind of outrage this behavior might have stirred had it occurred in a
house of worship of some other faith. See Mike Dorning, Animosity Over Gays
Threatens St. Pat Parade: New York’s Irish March Will Go On, But Sexual Minority
Plans a Protest, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 15, 1993, 1993 WLNR 4062014. The purported
“newspaper of record” in New York City, the Times, did not initially report on this
highly insensitive incident. See, e.g., Bruce Weber, Tangle of Issues in St. Patrick’s
Brouhaha, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1992, at B3, 1992 WLNR 3351573; Sam Roberts, One
More Time, With Turmoil: True to Tradition, St. Patrick’s Marchers Face Controversy,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1993, at B1, 1993 WLNR 3367862.
13
“It has been many years since the poet and essayist Peter Viereck called antiCatholicism ’the anti-Semitism of the intellectuals.’” wrote Peter Steinfels in Beliefs,
N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1997. Viereck’s actual words were that “Catholic-baiting is the antiSemitism of the liberals.” Peter Viereck, SHAME AND GLORY OF THE INTELLECTUALS 45
(1953). While Viereck’s words are misquoted regularly, the spirit of his comment
remains true. See Mark S. Massa, ANTI-CATHOLICISM IN AMERICA: THE LAST
ACCEPTABLE PREJUDICE 7 (2003) (acknowledging anti-Catholicism as the “antiSemitism of the intellectuals”).
14
See, e.g., infra notes 19–26 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez.
15
See, e.g., FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION, PRAY TO PLAY: CHRISTIAN
COACHES AND CHAPLAINS ARE CONVERTING FOOTBALL FIELDS INTO MISSION FIELDS
(2015), http://ffrf.org/images/PraytoPlayReport.pdf. For a summary of the report, see
FREEDOM FROM RELIGION FOUNDATION, State/Church Watchdog Issues Report
Damning College Football Chaplains, Coaches, Aug. 17, 2015, http://ffrf.org/news/newsreleases/item/23528-state-church-watchdog-issues-report-damning-college-footballchaplains-coaches (calling on officials at public colleges and universities to whom the
report was sent to terminate the employment of chaplains, and instead hire counselors,
or face legal action).
16
See infra note 149 for a brief discussion of Gay Rights Coalition v.
Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987) (en banc).
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a religious nature, from the public marketplace of ideas (known
as American higher education) in favor of the politically correct
flavor of the day.
Against this backdrop of threats to religious freedom on the
post-Obergefell horizon, the remainder of this article is divided
into three substantive parts. The first section briefly reviews
recent Supreme Court judgments undercutting religious
freedom when it comes into conflict with the interests of
individuals who are gay, showing that the Justices have not
sought to forge a path of compromise protecting the rights of
persons on both sides of the issue. The first section also reviews
the judicial history of Obergefell along with a summary,
analysis, and critique of key portions of the Justices’ opinions.
The second section reflects on the status of religious freedom
for faith-based institutions and their employees, cautioning
them to be aware of the coming legal battles at a time when
some of their most cherished rights are under steady attack by
those who would usher in a fundamental transformation of the
United States leading to a “closing of the American mind.”17
The fourth section discusses possible solutions for religiously
affiliated institutions that feel threatened. The article rounds
out with a brief reflection on the status of religious freedom in
the United States.
II.

SUPREME COURT CASES

This section briefly highlights three recent Supreme Court
cases impacting religious freedom18 before focusing on the
17
This idea mirrors the title of Allan Bloom’s seminal 1987 best-seller, The
Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and
Impoverished the Souls of Today’s Students.
18
In fairness, the Supreme Court did uphold religious liberty in three other
cases not involving issues of sexual preference that were decided during this time
frame. In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. Equal Emp’t
Opportunities Comm’n, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012), a unanimous Court, in an opinion by
Chief Justice Roberts, upheld the ministerial exception, reasoning that Church
officials, rather that the Federal Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, had
the right to decide who qualified as a minister. For commentary on this case, see
Charles J. Russo & Paul E. McGreal, Religious Freedom in American Catholic Higher
Education, 39 REL. & EDUC. 116 (2012). Two years later, in Town of Greece v.
Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811 (2014), a five-to-four judgment authored by Justice Kennedy
upheld a policy of a town governing board allowing its meetings to be opened with a
prayer offered by a member of the clergy selected from the congregations listed in a
local directory. For a commentary, see Eric Rassbach, Town of Greece v. Galloway: The
Establishment Clause and the Rediscovery of History, 2014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 71
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Court’s judgment in Obergefell.
A.

Christian Legal Society v. Martinez

Christian Legal Society v. Martinez19 involved a dispute
from the public university, Hastings College of the Law, where
Christian law students failed in their challenge to a campus
policy.20 The policy forbade them from retaining their status as
members of a recognized campus organization entitled to
benefits unless they accepted individuals for leadership
positions who did not share their values.21 The challenge arose
because the Christian society required members and officers to
sign a “Statement of Faith,” directing them to comply with its
principles, such as the belief that sexual activity should not
occur outside of marriage between a man and a woman.22 The
Statement also refused affiliation to anyone who participated
in “unrepentant homosexual conduct.”23
In a five-to-four judgment written by Justice Ginsburg, the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of what campus
officials described as their “all-comers” policy.24 Under this
policy, groups had to accept all persons for leadership roles,
even if individuals did not share in organizational values or
missions. Justice Alito’s dissent sought to invalidate the allcomers policy as unreasonably infringing on the rights of
members of the Society because it placed a substantial burden
(2014). During the same term, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), in a
five-to-four opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Court decided that insofar as closely
held for-profit corporations are legal persons, they do not have to comply with
regulations imposing an abortifacient mandate that are not part of the Affordable
Health Care Act. The Court reasoned that even if the government had a compelling
interest in mandating such coverage, it substantially burdened the free exercise of the
owners’ right to religious freedom in violation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
because the regulations failed to achieve their goal in the least restrictive manner and
so conflicted with the owners’ deeply held religious beliefs.
19
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of California v. Martinez, 561 U.S.
661 (2010). For a much more detailed analysis of this case, see William E. Thro &
Charles J. Russo, A Serious Setback for Freedom: The Implications of Christian Legal
Society v. Martinez, 261 EDUC. L. REP. 473 (2010). See also Zachary R. Cormier,
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez: The Death Knell of Associational Freedom on the
College Campus, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 287 (2011).
20
Christian Legal Soc’y, 561 U.S. at 662.
21
Id. at 661.
22
Id.
23
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
24
Id. at 669.
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on their free exercise of religion.25 Although the law school
officials had not relied on the “all-comers” policy until the
Christian group challenged the denial of its request for
recognized status, the Court rejected the concerns of the
students and Justice Alito’s dissent that the policy imposed a
significant restriction on religious freedom.
On remand, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Society’s
remaining claims that university officials violated their right to
religious freedom.26 The court rejected this because the
Society’s leaders failed to preserve their argument that officials
selectively applied the policy.
B.

United States v. Windsor

United States v. Windsor27 was decided on the same day as
Hollingsworth v. Perry.28 Windsor, which was decided on the
merits of the claim, rather than on the procedural question of
standing over the status of same-sex unions, has significant
potential to impact operations in faith-based educational
institutions at all levels. Windsor arose when a taxpayer in
New York, as the surviving partner of a same-sex couple,
successfully challenged29 being denied the benefit of a spousal
tax deduction due to definition of “marriage” and “spouse”
provided in the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).30 In response
to the plaintiff’s suit seeking a refund of federal estate taxes as
well as a declaration that the pertinent provision of DOMA
could not deny the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment,31 the Supreme Court affirmed an
25
Id. at 706 (Alito, J., dissenting). Justice Alito’s dissent was joined by Chief
Justice Roberts along with Justices Scalia and Thomas.
26
See Christian Legal Soc’y v. Wu, 626 F.3d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 2010).
27
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). For representative
commentary on this case, see Marc R. Poirier, “Whiffs of Federalism”
in United States v. Windsor: Power, Localism, and Kulturkampf, 85 U. COLO. L. REV.
935 (2014); Susannah W. Pollvogt, Marriage Equality, United States v. Windsor, and
the Crisis in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1045 (2014); Jamie
L. Johnson, DOMA: Turning the Love Boat into the Titanic How the United States v.
Windsor Opinion Affects Maritime Law, 14 LOY. MAR. L.J. 408 (2015).
28
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct 2652 (2013).
29
A federal trial court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, 833 F. Supp.
2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) and the Second Circuit affirmed on her behalf, 699 F.3d 169
(2nd Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012).
30
Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
31
In relevant part, the Fifth Amendment reads: “No person shall . . . be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law[.]”
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earlier order in her favor.
In a five-to-four judgment authored by Justice Kennedy,32
the Supreme Court invalidated DOMA, regarding it as an
unconstitutional deprivation of the right to liberty of the person
protected by the Fifth Amendment because it defined marriage
as a union of one man and one woman as husband and wife.33
The Court added that this definition operated to deprive samesex couples of the benefits and responsibilities accompanying
the federal recognition of their marriages, thereby placing a
stigma on those who entered into same-sex unions.34
According to Justice Kennedy, “[i]n determining whether a
law is motived by an improper animus or purpose,
‘[d]iscriminations of an unusual character’ . . . require careful
consideration.”35 Absent any proof of a discriminatory animus,
Kennedy added that “no legitimate purpose overcomes the
purpose and effect [of DOMA] to disparage and to injure those
whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in
personhood and dignity.”36
Disagreeing vociferously with Kennedy, Justice Scalia
rejected the majority’s assertion “that the motivation for
DOMA was to ‘demean’;” to “‘impose inequality’;” to “‘impose . .
. a stigma’;” to deny people ‘equal dignity’;” to brand gay people
as ‘unworthy’;” and to “‘humiliat[e]’.”37 Scalia questioned the
Supreme Court’s authority to invalidate legislation enacted as
part of the democratic process. This is an issue of the Court’s
authority again came to the fore in Obergefell, wherein the
Court essentially granted the judiciary supremacy over
Congress and the president. The Court granted itself such
power even though Congress enacted DOMA in 1996 by
margins of 342 to 67 in the House of Representatives38 and 85
to 14 in the Senate.39 President Bill Clinton subsequently
32
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan.
33
Chief Justice Roberts at 133 S. Ct. 2696 filed a dissenting opinion. Justice
Scalia, id. at 2697, filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas and in
which Chief Justice Roberts joined as to Part I. Justice Alito, id. at 2711, filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined as to Parts II and III.
34
Id. at 2693.
35
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693 (2013) (citations omitted).
36
Id. at 2697.
37
Id. at 2708 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations and emphasis omitted).
38
142 CONG. REC. 103, H7505 (daily ed. July 12, 1996).
39
142 CONG. REC. 123, S10129 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996).

2.Russo.Proof2.263-308.docx (Do Not Delete)

2]

6/2/16 5:46 PM

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND OBERGEFELL

271

signed DOMA into law.
In light of DOMA’s legislative history, it is puzzling at best
why Kennedy made such a sweeping and ultimately meanspirited statement about DOMA’s legislative intent absent
evidence, especially insofar as the Court’s dramatic action was
virtually unthinkable as recently as fifteen or twenty years
ago. However, this much is certain: Justice Kennedy’s
statements on behalf of the Court invalidating DOMA—
essentially describing supporters of marriage between one man
and one woman as being motivated by hate and refusing to
recognize legitimate religious beliefs—should serve as a stark
warning to religious leaders about the precarious status of the
Free Exercise Clause as well as the conflicts to come.
Moreover, in light of Justice Alito’s comment that believers
may be vilified40 for remaining true to their faiths, it remains to
be seen what may happen to faith-based schools for continuing
to teach the values their religions have sincerely held through
the ages.
C.

Hollingsworth v. Perry

Hollingsworth v. Perry41 arose when same-sex couples who
were denied marriage licenses due to California’s Proposition 8
sued the Governor and various state officials. Proposition 8 was
a voter-enacted ballot initiative amending the state
Constitution to provide that only marriage between a man and
a woman was valid. The plaintiffs successfully alleged that the
initiative eliminated their right to marry while violating their
rights to due process and equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment.42
Without reaching the merits of the underlying claims, in
another five-to-four judgment, this one authored by Chief
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2642.
133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), on remand, 725 F.3d 1140 (9th Cir. 2013) (dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction). For representative commentary on this case, see, e.g., Matthew
A.
Melone
& George
A.
Nation
III,
“Standing”
on
Formality: Hollingsworth v. Perry and the Efficacy of Direct Democracy in the United
States, 29 BYU J. PUB. L. 25 (2014); Glenn S. Koppel, “Standing” In the Shadow of
Erie: Federalism in the Balance in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 34 PACE L. REV. 631 (2014).
42
Starting with Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.Supp.2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010),
this case had a lengthy procedural history culminating in Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d
1052 (9th Cir. 2012), rehearing en banc denied, 681 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2012), cert.
granted sub nom., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
40
41
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Justice Roberts,43 the Court affirmed an earlier order that the
plaintiffs lacked the ability to intervene to defend the
initiative. More specifically, the Court maintained that private
parties lack standing44 to defend the constitutionality of state
statutes because the plaintiffs had what the Court described as
an individualized grievance and they were not agents of the
State,45 even where public officials charged with the duty to do
so chose not to act.46 As with Windsor, arguably less to the
point insofar as it primarily addressed standing, if supporters
of same sex unions are unwilling to demonstrate the tolerance
of religious institutions that they demand in return, then faith
based schools may be subject to litigation ultimately resulting
in their financial demise.
D.

Obergefell v. Hodges

1. Facts and judicial history
The facts in Obergefell are as straightforward as Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion was fractured. The litigation began
when fourteen same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex
partners were deceased successfully filed suit in Michigan,47
Kentucky,48 Ohio,49 and Tennessee50 to obtain marriage licenses
or recognition of their partnerships. All of the jurisdictions,
which make up the Sixth Circuit, defined marriage as being
between one man and one woman. The courts ruled in favor of
the plaintiffs who alleged that the statutory and state
constitutional provisions at issue violated the Fourteenth
Amendment by denying them the right to marry or to have
their marriages that were performed in other jurisdictions
recognized where they lived.
On further review, the Sixth Circuit consolidated the
43
See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2659 (Chief Justice Roberts delivered the
opinion of the Court and was joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan.).
44
Id. at 2666.
45
Id.
46
Interestingly, although he was author of the Supreme Court’s opinion in
Windsor, Justice Kennedy filed a dissent at 2668 which was joined by Justices Thomas,
Alito, and Sotomayor.
47
DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014).
48
Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
49
Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968 (S.D. Ohio 2013); Henry v.
Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036 (S.D. Ohio 2014).
50
Tanco v. Haslam, 7 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. Tenn. 2014).
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actions into one case, reversing in favor of the states on the
ground that their officials did not have constitutional duties to
grant licenses to same-sex couples who wished to marry or to
recognize such arrangements entered into in other
jurisdictions.51 Not surprisingly, the advocates appealed to the
Supreme Court which reversed in their favor, establishing
same-sex unions as the law of the land by judicial fiat in a
closely divided opinion.
2. Justice Kennedy for the Court.
At the outset of the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy, in a
five-to-four judgment,52 identified the two questions before the
Court. He stated that,
The first, presented by the cases from Michigan and
Kentucky, is whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a
State to license a marriage between two people of the same
sex. The second, presented by the cases from Ohio, Tennessee,
and, again, Kentucky, is whether the Fourteenth Amendment
requires a State to recognize a same-sex marriage licensed
and performed in a State which does grant that right.53

Justice Kennedy devoted the first four sections of his
analysis to the first issue, but a scant three paragraphs to the
second question.
Justice Kennedy opened his analysis by paying lip service
to the centrality of marriage, citing to no less a figure than
Cicero.54 In so doing, Kennedy conceding that “[i]t is fair and
necessary to say these references were based on the
understanding that marriage is a union between two persons of
the opposite sex.”55
The second section of the opinion began with Justice
Kennedy’s musings about changes in marriage over the years
such as appropriately affording women greater roles and
DeBoer v. Snyder 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014).
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2584 (Justice Kennedy was joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent was joined by
Justices Scalia and Thomas. Justice Scalia’s dissent was joined by Justice Thomas.
Justice Thomas’s dissent was joined by Justice Scalia. Justice Alito’s dissent was joined
by Justices Scalia and Thomas).
53
Id. at 2593.
54
See id. at 2594 (Cicero wrote, “The first bond of society is marriage; next,
children; and then the family.”) (internal citations omitted).
55
Id.
51
52
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ensuring
their
equality;
he
aptly
described
such
transformations as helping to strengthen the institution of
marriage. Using this as a departure point, Kennedy embarked
on a review of attitudes toward those in same-sex
relationships,
noting
that
until
relatively
recently,
homosexuality was considered a psychological illness.56 Later in
the twentieth century, he pointed out, same-sex couples began
to lead more open lives and establish their own families which,
in turn, led to litigation over their status.
Moving into the heart of his order, Justice Kennedy
reviewed the evolution of key litigation starting with Bowers v.
Hardwick.57 Bowers was the first case in which the Court
addressed the status of homosexuals,58 but it upheld the
constitutionality of a law from Georgia criminalizing a variety
of intimate acts between homosexuals. Justice Kennedy
observed that change was in the offing, starting with his own
opinion in Romer v. Evans,59 in which the Court invalidated a
provision of the Colorado Constitution intended to deny
protection to individuals based on their sexual orientations as
lacking a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental
purpose.
Justice Kennedy identified his 2003 opinion in Lawrence v.
Texas as the big breakthrough with regard to gay lifestyles.60
Justice Kennedy remarked that not only did Lawrence strike
down as unconstitutional a Texas statute making it a crime for
two consenting males to engage in specified intimate sexual
conduct in the privacy of their home, but also explicitly
overturned Bowers. Justice Kennedy acknowledged that in the
same year as Bowers, Congress enacted, and President Clinton
signed into law, DOMA.61 DOMA defined marriage as being
between one man and one woman, a definition that the Court
subsequently invalidated in Windsor.62
With Romer as a kind of impetus, Justice Kennedy
See id. at 2596.
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1988).
58
The author is aware that “gay” has replaced homosexual, but uses the word
when it appears in the Court’s opinion.
59
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
60
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
61
1 U.S.C. § 7.
62
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2675. Supra notes 27–40 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Windsor.
56
57
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documented how lower courts63 entered the fray. To this end,
Justice Kennedy commented that only the case at bar and a
dispute from the Eighth Circuit64 deviated from the judicial
norm that preventing same-sex couples from being allowed to
marry was unconstitutional.65 Justice Kennedy entered the
third, and lengthiest, part of his analysis by citing the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, pursuant to
which “no State shall ‘deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.’”66 He added that
fundamental liberties include “intimate choices that define
personal identity and beliefs.”67 Even so, Justice Kennedy
conceded that the Court has yet to devise a formula in
protecting such fundamental rights. In an unintended irony,
Justice Kennedy determined that those who “wrote and ratified
the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment did not
presume to know the extent of freedom in all of its dimensions,
and so they entrusted to future generations a charter
protecting the right of all persons to enjoy liberty as we learn
its meaning,”68 essentially providing cover for the judicial
activism displayed in the remainder of his order.
After a brief review of cases wherein the Supreme Court
interpreted the Constitution as protecting the right to marry,69
Justice Kennedy made a quantum judicial leap. Lacking
precedent to support his position, he declared that “[i]t cannot
be denied that this Court’s cases describing the right to marry
presumed a relationship involving opposite-sex partners.”70
Justice Kennedy then identified four principles and traditions
under which he applied the constitutional principles associated
with marriage to same-sex couples.
Justice Kennedy went on to say that “[a] first premise of the
63
See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Hawaii 1993) (although not
imposing same-sex unions as a matter of law, the court declared that a law restricting
marriage on the basis of sex was subject to strict scrutiny); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 945 (Mass. 2003) (determining that limiting the “protections,
benefits and obligations of civil marriage to individuals of opposite sexes lacked [a]
rational basis and violated the state constitutional equal protection principles.”).
64
Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859 (8th Cir. 2006).
65
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608–09.
66
Id. at 2597.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 2598.
69
Id.
70
Id.
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Court’s relevant precedents is that the right to personal choice
regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual
autonomy.”71 It is certainly true, as he declared, that decisions
about marriage and family are among the most intimate
individuals can make, shaping their destinies in enduring
bonds. However, Justice Kennedy failed to make the case why
members of same-sex unions who cannot procreate should have
the same rights to marriage, and why religious believers and
institutions should run the risk of being charged with
discrimination if they disagree with the vision he shared with
the advocates and amici behind Obergefell.
Kennedy started with the fair proposition that the right “to
marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union
unlike any other in its importance to the committed
individuals.”72 However, he stopped short of explaining why
same-sex unions can be allowed to change the meaning of
marriage that has stood the test of ages.
In another unintended irony, Kennedy observed that “[a]
third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it
safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from
related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.”73
While this is accurate—and readily conceding that same-sex
couples can provide loving homes to children, without
considering the psychological impact on their well-being—he
once more failed to justify why it was necessary to allow five
unelected-judges to radically redefine marriage rather than
allow changes to play out through the democratic process. If
anything, this section of his opinion stands out as
shortsightedly placing the primary focus on the desires of
adults rather than the needs of children, seemingly putting the
cart before the horse in terms of sound child-rearing.
The final premise that Justice Kennedy touched on was the
belief that “this Court’s cases and the Nation’s traditions make
clear that marriage is a keystone of our social order.”74 After
reciting various aspects of marriage such as inheritance and
property rights, visitation rights in hospitals, and medical
decision-making power—all of which can be available without
71
72
73
74

Id. at 2599.
Id.
Id. at 2600.
Id. at 2601.
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redefining marriage—he recognized marriage as being at the
center of a multitude of aspects in American social life and
order. In describing marriage as being at the center of life,
Justice Kennedy was of the view that insofar as there is no
difference between same-sex and opposite-sex couples,
excluding the former from this arrangement denied them many
state benefits. He maintained that such exclusions demean
gays and lesbians because it prevents them from enjoying the
fundamental right to marry and, in so doing, rejected
arguments to the contrary.75
Kennedy sought to buttress his assertion that the right to
marry is a form of liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment and expanded his view to describe it as a synergy
working in conjunction with the Equal Protection Clause. 76
Insofar as Justice Kennedy failed to support his position by
discussing equal protection analysis, Chief Justice Roberts
later took him to task for this omission.77 Justice Kennedy
commented that the Court’s equal protection analysis “has
recognized that new insights and societal understandings can
reveal unjustified inequality within our most fundamental
institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged[,]”78 a
claim that Justice Scalia scathingly rejected.79 In doing so,
Justice Kennedy cited to an array of equal protection cases,
particularly his own opinion in Lawrence, arguing that the
marriage laws at issue limited both the liberty and equal
protection rights of the petitioners by imposing continuing
harms on them that he was unable to identify. One can only
wonder how this will play out if same sex couples wish to enroll
their children in faith based schools even though they openly
live in a manner inconsistent with the express teachings of the
governing religious bodies of these institutions.
In the fourth section of his analysis, Justice Kennedy
unconvincingly sought to rebut the dissenters who reasoned
that the Court acted too hastily, shortchanging the democratic
process by imposing same-sex unions as the law of the land.
Rejecting a call for caution in creating a new fundamental
75
76
77
78
79

See id. at 2602.
Id.
See infra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603.
Id. at 2631.
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right, Justice Kennedy worried that any other result would
have inflicted pain and humiliation on gays and lesbians,
creating grave harm to their dignity.80
In the final paragraph of the fourth section, and a scant five
paragraphs from the end of his opinion,—perhaps
inadvertently demonstrating that the Court did not view
religious liberty as deserving a more central role in its order—
Justice Kennedy unpersuasively sought to allay the concerns
of believers:
Finally, it must be emphasized that religions, and those who
adhere to religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with
utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex
marriage should not be condoned. The First Amendment
ensures that religious organizations and persons are given
proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are
so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths, and to
their own deep aspirations to continue the family structure
they have long revered.81

Interestingly, Justice Kennedy spoke of the rights of
believers to advocate and teach their positions. Yet, just as in
Windsor, he failed to demonstrate any respect for the positions
of people of faith early in his opinion and wrote little about
concrete protections they would be afforded to safeguard their
constitutional right to freedom of religion.
In the briefest and final section of the Court’s opinion,
Justice Kennedy addressed “whether the Constitution requires
States to recognize same-sex marriages validly performed out
of State.”82 He summarily found that if same-sex couples can
exercise their right to enter marriages in their home states,
there is no lawful ground on which to refuse to recognize such
unions if they are performed in other jurisdictions. He thus
concluded by granting the petitioners the right to be equal to
opposite-sex couples under the law.
3. Dissenting Opinions
a. Chief Justice Roberts. Chief Justice Roberts’s fairly lengthy
dissent, which was joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas,
conceded at its outset that the petitioners made strong
80
81
82

See Id. at 2607.
Id.
Id.
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arguments, and acknowledged that eleven states and the
District of Columbia allow same-sex unions.83 At the same time,
though, he stressed that the judicial branch was meant to
determine what the law is, not make it or redefine it, a theme
running through the dissents. Roberts added that “this Court is
not a legislature. Whether same-sex marriage is a good idea
should be of no concern to us. Under the Constitution, judges
have power to say what the law is, not what it should be.”84
In the following paragraph, Roberts added that compelling
policy arguments in support of redefining marriage aside, no
such legal arguments existed, emphasizing that “[t]he
fundamental right to marry does not include a right to make a
state change its definition of marriage.”85 Further, he described
the Court’s ruling as “an act of will, not [a] legal judgment”86
because the majority essentially confused its own preferences
with what the law requires in its headlong rush to bypass the
democratic process. At this point, Roberts made his first of
sixteen, mostly highly critical, references to Lochner v. New
York. In Lochner, the Court invalidated a law designed to
regulate the number of hours bakers could work in a day or
week. 87 The Lochner Court struck the law down as an
unnecessary interference with the liberty to enter into
contracts protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Chief
Justice Roberts later cautioned that the Court avoid the same
mistake as in Lochner by “converting personal preferences into
constitutional mandates”88 that might impact the ability of
faith-based schools to operate.
Roberts then specified that his dissent was not about the
Court’s action in changing the definition of marriage. Rather,
he emphasized that he was concerned with whether such an
important task as redefining marriage should have been left to
the people and the democratic process instead of five lawyers
Id. at 2611.
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 2612.
87
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For representative commentary on
this case, see David E. Bernstein, Lochner v. New York: A Centennial Retrospective, 83
WASH. U. L.Q. 1469 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
873 (1987); Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American
Constitutional Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1991).
88
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2618.
83
84
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assigned to resolve legal disputes.89
Part one of Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent focused on his
concern over the majority’s having paid lip service to marriage
as it existed over the millennia even as its own “precedents
have repeatedly described marriage in ways that are consistent
with its traditional meaning.”90 Amid shifting public opinion
and the workings of the political process, he was dismayed by
how the Court ignored the judgment of the Sixth Circuit, which
would have left the decision in the hands of voters.91
Chief Justice Roberts opened the second part of his dissent
by criticizing Justice Kennedy’s four “principles and
traditions,” reasoning that they lacked a basis in either except
for the “unprincipled tradition of judicial policymaking that
characterized discredited decisions such as Lochner.”92 Chief
Justice Roberts discussed the nature of the petitioners’
fundamental rights claim, noting that they viewed marriage
not as an enumerated right, which it clearly never was.
Instead, he observed that the petitioners relied on the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause as including a substantive aspect designed to protect
liberties that are so deeply grounded in American society as to
be considered fundamental and cannot be denied absent a
compelling governmental interest.
The Chief Justice went on to debunk the majority’s reliance
on cases dealing with the right to marriage such as Loving v.
Virginia, wherein the Supreme Court invalidated a ban on
interracial marriage.93 He distinguished the earlier cases from
the current issue to the extent that the petitioners in Obergefell
desired same-sex unions while the precedents on which they
relied addressed the traditional definition of marriage as being
between one man and one woman. Expanding on his rationale,
Chief Justice Roberts thought that the petitioners inaptly
relied on Griswold v. Connecticut,94 wherein the Court struck
down a ban on contraceptives, and Lawrence v. Texas,95
Id. at 2612.
Id. at 2614.
91
See id. at 2615.
92
Id. at 2616.
93
See id. at 2619; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
94
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
95
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558. See supra note 60 for a brief discussion of
Lawrence.
89
90
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discussed earlier. Chief Justice Roberts conceded that the cases
the petitioners relied on touched on different dimensions of
privacy in light of the intimate conduct of individuals in samesex unions. However, he rejected the application of these cases
insofar as the right they pursued was anything but private
because they were seeking public recognition of their relations,
accompanied by governmental benefits.
Remarking that the majority was unable to find genuine
support in the Court’s precedent, he suggested that the only
case it could rely on was his bette noir of the day, Lochner,
which he criticized in four references over three paragraphs.
Chief Justice Roberts was troubled because rather than
proceed slowly in defining fundamental rights in light of the
“debacle” of Lochner, “the majority casts caution aside and
revives the grave errors of that period.”96 Reviewing the
majority’s reliance on Lochner to argue that permitting samesex unions would not harm themselves or others, Chief Justice
Roberts pointed out that what he described as the “harm
principle” was more of a philosophical than legal position.97
Rejecting this approach, Roberts maintained “that when
unelected judges strike down democratically enacted laws” via
the democratic process in “discovering” implied fundamental
rights, “they do so based on something more than their own
beliefs.”98 This approach, however, was absent in Obergefell.
In the third, and briefest, part of his dissent, the Chief
Justice rebutted the majority’s reliance on what he described
as an inapt synergy between the Equal Protection99 and Due
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2621.
Id. at 2622.
98
Id. at 2622–23.
99
Briefly stated, according to the Equal Protection Clause, “No state shall . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.” U.S. CONST.
amend. IV, § 1. Further, under equal protection analysis, individuals or groups that are
“similarly situated should be treated alike.” Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 439 (1985).
In equal protection analysis cases, “. . . if a law neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, [the Court] will uphold the legislative
classification so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.” Romer, 517
U.S. at 631. Conversely, classifications based on constitutionally suspect factors such
as race, legislatively protected categories such as race, or fundamental constitutional
rights are unlikely to survive strict scrutiny unless they serve compelling governmental
interests that are narrowly tailored to achieve their goals. While not using this
language, the Court essentially applied this standard in Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). Amazingly, though, the Court applied rational basis in Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the internment of Japanese96
97
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Process Clauses.100 Chief Justice Roberts rejected this approach
because he was of the view that the majority neither framed
the dispute within the usual framework for an equal protection
claim nor made more than conclusory claims to explain how or
why this clause provided an alternative justification for the
outcome. If anything, he was convinced that an equal
protection claim should have failed because treating same-sex
and opposite-sex couples in the same manner is “rationally
related to States’ ‘legitimate state interest’ in ‘preserving the
traditional institution of marriage.’”101
Briefly stated, in the final portion of his dissent, Chief
Justice Roberts ruminated on how the majority essentially
ignored the democratic process, instead making itself the
supreme law of the land. To this end, and as witnessed by
ongoing controversy over abortion, he presciently wrote that
“[p]eople denied a voice are less likely to accept the ruling of a
court on an issue that does not seem to be the sort of things
courts usually decide.”102
Turning to what may be described as the issue of the day,
the Chief Justice addressed his concerns about how the Court’s
imposition of same-sex unions would impact religious freedom.
In fact, he highlighted how the Solicitor General
“acknowledged that the tax exemptions of some religious
institutions would be in question if they opposed same-sex
marriage,”103 adding that this and similar questions would soon
be subject to litigation because “people of faith can take no
comfort in the treatment they receive from the majority
today.”104 Rounding out this part of his dissent, the Chief
Americans during World War II based on their ancestry). When courts apply the
compelling interest test, governmental actions typically fail.
Other classifications, such as illegitimacy, alienage, and gender, are subject to
intermediate scrutiny. This standard is not as difficult for the government to meet as
the compelling interest test since it involves less deference to legislation than rational
relations. Under this test, the Supreme Court refuses to uphold classifications unless
they bear “substantial relationships” to “important” governmental interests. The case
coming closest to applying this standard in a school setting was Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S.
202 (1982) (upholding the rights of children who were undocumented residents to
attend public schools), reh’g denied, 458 U.S. 1131 (1982), even though the majority did
not clearly indicate that it was applying this test.
100
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2623.
101
Id. (citing to Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585) (citations omitted).
102
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2625.
103
Id. at 2626 (citations omitted).
104
Id.
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Justice disagreed with the way in which the majority
repeatedly denigrated people who believe in the understanding
of marriage that has existed throughout history. He feared that
Kennedy’s gratuitous, unfounded, and ultimately meanspirited “assaults on the character of fairminded [sic] people
will have an effect, in society and in court”105 for years to come.
As noted throughout, these kinds of attitudes can have direct
impacts on faith based institutions insofar as they may not
survive challenges to the ability to retain their values or close.
Chief Justice Roberts ended his dissent on a note of caution.
He suggested that those who were happy with the outcome in
Obergefell would be able to celebrate the Court’s holding but
they could not celebrate the Constitution because the judgment
from which he was dissenting had nothing to do with the
Constitution.106
b. Justice Scalia. Justice Scalia’s brief, pointed dissent, which
was joined by Justice Thomas,107 began with his assertion that
his larger concern was not so much the way in which marriage
is defined, but how a bare majority of nine judges can impose
their will over 320 million Americans.108 He pointed out that
until the Court put an end to it, the American people
demonstrated democracy at its best by engaging in a spirited
debate over how to define marriage. In fact, he acknowledged
that proponents of same-sex unions succeeded in eleven states
even as advocates continued to press their arguments in
public.109
Justice Scalia chided the majority for mistakenly relying on
the Fourteenth Amendment to remove this debate from the
political process. He explained that when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified in 1868, all states defined marriage as
being between one man and one woman with little doubt of its
constitutionality.110 Justice Scalia believed that insofar as the
Court lacked the authority to invalidate a set of laws not
expressly forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment, its
judgment was nothing more than “a naked judicial claim to
105
106
107
108
109
110

Id.
Id. at 2626.
Id. at 2626 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2627.
Id.
Id. at 2628.
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legislative—indeed, super-legislative—power;
a
claim
fundamentally at odds with our system of government.”111
Continuing his criticism of what he described as a “judicial
Putsch,” Scalia excoriated the majority for having
discovered in the Fourteenth Amendment a ‘fundamental
right’ overlooked by every person alive at the time of
ratification, and almost everyone else in the time since
[seeing] what lesser legal minds [such as] . . . Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., . . . Louis Brandeis, William Howard Taft,
Benjamin Cardozo, Hugo Black, Felix Frankfurter, . . . could
not.112

He thus characterized the opinion as “couched in a style
that is as pretentious as its content is egotistic.”113 In sum,
suffice it to say that Justice Scalia’s dissent warned the Court
that its overreaching had it marching inexorably “one step
closer to being reminded of our impotence.”114
c. Justice Thomas. Justice Thomas’s dissent, which was
joined by Justice Scalia,115 largely addressed the constitutional
notion of liberty that played a large part in the Court’s
rationale. He began by providing a detailed history of the
Fourteenth Amendment, noting that it traced its origins to the
Magna Carta.116 In so doing, Justice Thomas also reviewed the
history of the Fifth Amendment and its narrow use of the term
“liberty,” suggesting that this limited approach likely applied to
the Fifth Amendment as well.117 He finished this point by
observing that the Court’s earliest uses of the Fourteenth
Amendment “appear to interpret the Clause as using ‘liberty’ to
Id. at 2629.
Id.
113
Id. at 2630.
114
Id. at 2631. In light of Scalia’s statement, “[a] new Rasmussen Reports
national telephone survey [released on July 24, 2015] finds that 36% of Likely U.S.
Voters still think the high court is doing a good or excellent job, but that’s down from
the recent high of 38% measured just after the court issued its rulings in June.” The
data were gathered in response to the question “How would you rate the way the
Supreme Court is doing its job,”? in a survey of 1,000 likely voters taken July 21-22,
2015. The responses as broken down were: Excellent, 9%; Good, 27%; Fair 30%; Poor
31%; Not sure, 3%. Supreme Court Update What do Voters Think of the Supreme Court
Now? RASMUSSEN REPORTS (July 24, 2015), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/
public_content/politics/mood_of_america/supreme_court_update.
115
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2631 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
116
Id. at 2632.
117
Id. at 2633.
111
112
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mean freedom from physical restraint,” which would not
include the liberty to recreate marriage. 118
Having narrowed the scope of the term “liberty,” Justice
Thomas showed that liberty in this context refers to being free
from government action in the form of physical restraints and
imprisonment rather than an entitlement to benefits.119
Moreover, he was of the opinion that regardless of how one
defined liberty, the petitioners had not lost their liberty
because they were neither restrained nor imprisoned as a
consequence of having entered into same-sex relationships.120
Rather, he acknowledged that the petitioners were free to
cohabit, raise children, and were left alone to live as they
wished without any restrictions on their daily lives.121
What the petitioners really wanted, Justice Thomas
maintained, were entitlements to the benefits of marriage that
they claimed existed because of the government.122 According to
Justice Thomas, among the benefits the petitioners sought
were a governmental imprimatur on their relationships via
official forms and a variety of monetary benefits such as
reductions in death taxes.123 Justice Thomas determined that
the Founders would have allowed the petitioners to do as they
were doing: exchange vows, raise children, and live free from
governmental interference.124 Justice Thomas even cited to
Locke who wrote that, “[t]he first society was between man and
wife, which gave beginning to that between parents and
children.”125 Thomas rejected the petitioners’ misunderstanding
of marriage, and reminded the majority that it was dealing
with a negative liberty, which protects people from restrictions
rather than granting them positive rights such as those the
petitioners sought.126
Justice Thomas also identified two areas, the political
process and religious liberty, in which the Court’s
misunderstanding of liberty would likely cause collateral
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126

Id. at 2634.
Id.
Id. at 2635.
Id.
Id. at 2635–36.
Id. at 2636.
Id.
Id. at 2636 (citations omitted).
Id. at 2635.
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damages. He feared that the Court undermined the political
process by disrespecting its ability to respect liberty. Justice
Thomas remarked that the political process had been working
robustly in light of debate, evidenced by voters in thirty-two of
the thirty-five states who were afforded the opportunity to
reframe marriage and chose to retain its traditional definition
as being between one man and one woman.127
Turning to religious liberty, Justice Thomas worried that
the Court’s judgment would result in conflict between the
government and religious institutions as well as people of faith.
In particular, he feared that the majority was unconcerned by
the fact that such conflict would arise, even though it is already
happening when “individuals and churches are confronted with
demands to participate in and endorse civil marriages between
same-sex couples.”128 He thus voiced his concern over the Court
having short-circuited the political process by refusing to leave
the definition of marriage to the voters, a process that had been
well under way. Had the Court done as Justice Thomas
interpreted the Constitution required, the people would have
taken the impact of changing the definition of marriage into
consideration rather than risk the potentially “ruinous
consequences for religious liberty”129 resulting from its order.
d. Justice Alito. Justice Alito opened his dissent, which was
joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas,130 by declaring that the
Court overstepped its boundaries insofar as the Constitution’s
silence on marriage left it as a matter to be resolved by the
States.131 At this point, he rebutted Justice Kennedy’s Liberty
Clause arguments noting that five unelected Justices misused
their authority to impose their will on the American people.132
He retorted that although the Court focused on the happiness
of those who choose to marry, this approach is inconsistent
with the traditional view over the millennia which defined
marriage as involving opposite-sex couples for the purpose of
procreation.133
127
128
129
130
131
132
133

Id. at 2638.
Id.
Id. at 2639.
Id. at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2641.
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Alito conceded that marriage has changed in the twentyfirst century, acknowledging that more than 40% of children in
the United States are born to unmarried women.134 Yet, he did
not agree that this changed the traditional view of marriage.
Citing to his dissent in Windsor, he emphasized that the Court
lacked the power to prevent States from preserving the
traditional view of marriage as being between one man and one
woman.135
Insofar as he viewed the majority’s opinion as usurping the
right of the People to decide whether to keep the traditional
view of marriage, Alito sounded the alarm that the Court’s
rationale would have other consequences, such as “be[ing] used
to vilify Americans who are unwilling to assent to the new
orthodoxy.”136 Reiterating that the power to define marriage
should have been left to the states, Alito worried that “[b]y
imposing its own views on the entire country, the majority
facilitates the marginalization of the many Americans who
have traditional ideas.”137 Alito conceded that the majority
sought to allay the concerns of believers. Yet, he remained
deeply concerned that “those who cling to old beliefs will be
able to whisper their thoughts in the recesses of their homes,
but if they repeat those views in public, they will risk being
labeled as bigots and treated as such by governments,
employers, and schools.”138
III. REFLECTIONS ON THE STATUS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION CONCERNS
As voiced by Justice Alito, there is a significant risk that in
the post-Obergefell world, the Supreme Court’s ruling “will be
used to vilify Americans who are unwilling to assent to the new
orthodoxy . . . by those who are determined to stamp out every
vestige of dissent.”139 Such a situation may occur—paeans from
Obergefell’s progressive supporters to the value of diversity and
openness notwithstanding—as long as one concurs with the
reigning progressive orthodoxy of the day.
134
135
136
137
138
139

Id.
Id. at 2642.
Id.
Id. at 2643.
Id. at 2642–43.
Id. at 2642.
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Opponents of Christianity, often led by those “on the
political left . . . [who] have taken to calling themselves and
their causes ‘progressive,’”140 rather than liberal, are typically
the antithesis of open-mindedness to views not conforming with
their own. If these critics of Christianity are successful in
marginalizing and excluding Christians’ voices from public life,
even though Christianity’s role was essential in the founding of
the Republic, it would be a detriment to all because of the
profoundly positive impact, with occasional pitfalls, that
Christianity’s teachings have generally had on American
society.
Should Justice Alito’s fear about the vilification of believers
come to fruition, it is likely to transpire at the hands of their
progressive opponents who apparently seek to deny tax-exempt
status to faith-based institutions. Such a change would have a
significantly negative impact on the ability of leaders in many
religiously-affiliated, non-public educational institutions to
make decisions for their schools, and would be detrimental to
untold millions of students and their families, not to mention
the wider society to which they have contributed so greatly.141
The condescending tone in Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion—his diktat that those who disagree lack a “better
informed understanding of how constitutional imperatives
define a liberty”142 such as the right to same-sex unions—along
with Justice Kennedy’s comments in Windsor143—demonstrate
that there is a clear lack of respect for the sincerely held beliefs
140
Michael Allan Wolf, Looking Backward: Richard Epstein Ponders the
“Progressive” Peril, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1233, 1245, n.50 (2007).
141
See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 247–48
(1968) (upholding loans of texts books for secular subjects to all students in New York,
including those who attended religiously affiliated elementary and secondary schools
(The decision acknowledged

that private education has played and is playing a significant and valuable role in
raising national levels of knowledge, competence, and experience. Americans care
about the quality of the secular education available to their children. They have
considered high quality education to be an indispensable ingredient for achieving
the kind of nation, and the kind of citizenry, that they have desired to create.
Considering this attitude, the continued willingness to rely on private school
systems, including parochial systems, strongly suggests that a wide segment of
informed opinion, legislative and otherwise, has found that those schools do an
acceptable job of providing secular education to their students. This judgment is
further evidence that parochial schools are performing, in addition to their
sectarian function, the task of secular education.)).

(citations omitted).
142
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
143
See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2675.
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of those who disagree with the progressive position.
An analysis of Obergefell reveals three initial concerns with
this deeply flawed decision that could influence the future of
faith-based educational institutions. First, as illustrated by the
dissent, a strong argument can be made that a bare majority of
the Supreme Court exceeded its authority, acting as a kind of
super legislature, in interpreting the Liberty Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by relying on the long discredited
Lochner doctrine. Roberts relied on Lochner, at least in part, to
mandate the imposition of same-sex unions in jurisdictions
where voters chose to retain the traditional view of marriage
and, in doing so, side-stepped the democratic process that was
underway.144 Indeed, as was highlighted by the dissenting
opinions, it is a stretch to describe Obergefell as being grounded
in any kind of thoughtful constitutional analysis. Rather, five
activist Justices were predetermined to achieve their desired
outcome regardless of the rule of law as it has been practiced in
the United States, essentially creating a judicial oligarchy.
A second concern emerges over judicial impartiality. In
light of language in the United States Code on judicial conflicts
of interest,145 a troubling aspect of the Supreme Court’s holding
is the non-recusals of Justices Ginsburg and Kagan in
Obergefell, both of whom have officiated at same-sex unions.146
Put another way, despite the fact that the Court invalidated
DOMA in Windsor, to the extent that these justices played
such formal roles in support of an issue that would soon be
before them ought to have given them pause to continue
hearing the case because they had already adopted public

144
In this regard, Justice Roberts pointed out that eleven States plus the
District of Columbia modified their laws to permit same-sex unions, Obergefell, 135 S.
Ct. at 2611, while Justice Thomas observed that voters in thirty-two of the thirty-five
states who were afforded the opportunity to redefine marriage retained its traditional
status as being between one man and one woman, id. at 2638.
145
See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2015) (“Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the
United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned.”).
146
See Paige Lavender, Ruth Bader Ginsburg Officiates Another SameSex Wedding, Gives a Special Shout-Out to the U.S. Constitution, HUFFINGTON POST
May 18, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/18/ruth-bader-ginsburg-gaywedding_n_7306584.html; Jarvis Deberry, Wasting Time—and Taxpayer Money—in
Baton Rouge, NEW ORLEANS TIMES PICAYUNE, May 5, 2015, at A 12, 2015 WLNR
13043951 (reporting that both Justices Ginsburg and Kagan have officiated at samesex unions).
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stances in support of same-sex unions.147 Why these justices did
not seek to avoid even the appearance of a conflict of interest,
let alone a real one, is puzzling at best.148
Third, even in acknowledging the authority of the Supreme
Court to interpret the Constitution, a questionable proposition
in Obergefell, it is important to bear in mind that the Court’s
rulings are not infallible and it may later recognize that its
earlier judgments were made in error. Further, one can readily
concede that Obergefell has not yet risen to the same level of
infamy as some of the Court’s universally rejected judgments
on such grave errors discussed in the following paragraph.
Still, people of good faith must hope that proponents of the new
definition of marriage do not push their views to the extreme in
seeking to remove the long engrained American ideal of
religious freedom from the marketplace of ideas.
In terms of egregious holdings, one needs to look only at the
Supreme Court’s most notorious judgments. While in no way
comparing the grave injustices associated with slavery,149 racial
segregation, whether in railway cars150 or in schools,151 or
discrimination based on national origin during a time of war,152
or discovering a right to abortion,153 these opinions reveal that,
as humans, the Justices are fallible products of their times. As
such, Justices are often shaped by the dominant social and
political perspectives of their day such that they rule without
regard to the Constitution, thereby rendering judgments that,
in retrospect, are acknowledged as having been unwise at best.
Surely, individuals who wish to enter into same-sex unions,
form families, inherit property, visit one another when ill, and
share many other aspects of life of which the Justices wrote,
147
See also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (Justice
Scalia recused himself because he criticized the judgement of the Ninth Circuit for
invalidating the words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance.).
148
See ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/mrpc/mcpr.
authcheckdam.pdf (While not suggesting that these justices violated any professional
code of ethics, it is worth noting that Canon 9 of the American Bar Association’s Code
of Ethics is that “A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional
Impropriety.”).
149
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (current or former slaves lacked
standing to litigate whether the could gain citizenship).
150
Plessy v. Ferguson, 186 U.S. 357 (1896).
151
Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 75 (1927); Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
152
Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214.
153
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 133 (1973) (finding a right to abortion).
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should retain the freedom to do so. Insofar as these are related
to, but distinct from education per se, it is important to bear in
mind that litigation is arising over whether individuals who
entered same sex unions can work in faith based institutions
and whether their children can enroll in these schools.154 As
such, in failing to ensure that this respect is bilateral,
Obergefell creates the risk that the Supreme Court’s order may
set in motion a process designed to bludgeon religious freedom
by subjecting believers in traditional marriage to nothing short
of persecution for faithfully adhering to their long and deeply
held religious beliefs. Such a consequence would be hostile to
the First Amendment and the basic principles on which the
United States was founded.
With the preceding as a backdrop, the next section of this
article examines institutional concerns associated with the
potential implementation of Obergefell and possible responses
to the challenges they present. Faith-based institutions face at
least six major challenges in the post-Obergefell world. These
matters are inter-related concerns posed by the intolerance of
progressives, and are likely to remain in play until institutions
and people of faith are protected from threats of vilification and
reprisal for remaining true to their long held beliefs on
marriage.
The first concern was highlighted at the outset of this
article during the oral argument in Obergefell. In a manner
consistent with the outcome in Bob Jones,155 Solicitor General
Verrilli suggested that a potential outcome of the Court’s
dramatic redefinition of marriage would be that the federal
tax-exempt status of religious institutions for refusing to bow
to its demands may be at risk.156 While conceding that the state
tax status of faith-based institutions was not at issue, it seems
likely that such challenges will not be long in coming. The
Solicitor General made his remark even though the definition
of marriage he helped to invalidate via judicial fiat was, as
noted, almost universally accepted in the United States barely
fifteen or twenty years ago. Consequently, individuals who
believe in marriage as being between one man and one woman
now risk having their faith proscribed and vilified as
154
155
156

See discussion below at note 225 and accompanying text.
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. 574.
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626.
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discrimination, no matter how long or deeply held these
religious convictions are.
As evidence of the intensity of the ongoing battle over
religious freedom, at least one opponent sued the Catholic
Church157 in an attempt to deny it aid in light of its pro-life
positions in response to abortion.158 Still other antagonists have
sought to have the Catholic Church classified as a hate group
in light of its stance with regard to homosexuality,159 thereby
demonstrating their own brand of intolerance while quick to
cast the first stone, as it were, at others.160 The threat of
governmental overreaching through such statutes and
regulations with the potential to force many faith-based
services out of operation runs the risk of standing the
constitutional guarantees of religious freedom long respected
by the American judiciary on their proverbial ears.
Second, one wonders whether the federal government will
seek to withhold financial aid, whether for direct research
157
The Catholic Church is by no means alone in being singled out for criticism
for its beliefs. For instance, the Southern Poverty Law Center has demonstrated broad
anti-Christian attitudes without regard to particular denominations within
Christianity in light of its difference of opinion with regard to a variety of issues. See
Matt Barber, Bloody Hands: The Southern Christian Poverty Law Center,
TOWNLALL.COM (Feb. 11, 2013), http://townhall.com/columnists/mattbarber/2013/02/11/
bloody-hands-the-southern-poverty-law-center-n1509321/page/full/ (“‘The Southern
Poverty Law Center has a long history of maliciously slandering pro-family groups
with language and labels that incite hatred and undermine civil discourse,’ said Mat
Staver, founder and chairman of Liberty Counsel.”); see also Katie Yoder, Networks
Ignore FRC Shooter’s use of SPLC ‘Hate Map’: ABC, NBC, CBS, and CNN Hide Latest
on Shooting at Conservative Group, MEDIA RESEARCH CTR CULTURE (Feb. 7, 2013, 3:47
PM),
http://www.mrc.org/articles/networks-ignore-frc-shooters-use-splc-hate-map
(detailing how the mainstream media failed to report that the map a man used to
locate the headquarters of the Family Research Center in Washington, D.C., where he
shot and injured a guard, was created at the SPLC; the map also identified the
locations of the offices of groups with which the SPLC disagreed).
158
Abortion Rights Mobilization v. U.S. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 1020 (2d
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 918 (1990) (affirming that a pro-abortion group lacked
standing to challenge the tax exempt status of the Roman Catholic Church based on its
pro-life teachings).
159
See Mary Beth Baker, An Assault on Freedom of Religion: Discrimination is
Wrong Even Against Traditional Christian Beliefs, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2013),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jan/23/an-assault-on-freedom-of-religion/;
see also Michelle Bauman, White House Petitioned to Label Catholic Church a “Hate
Group,”
CATHOLIC
NEWS
AGENCY
(Jan.
4,
2013,
4:09
AM),
http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/white-house-petitioned-to-label-catholicchurch-a-hate-group/.
160
See John 8.7 (Jerusalem Bible, 1966 translation) (“‘If there is one of you who
has not sinned, let him be the first to throw a stone at her’.”) (the story of the woman
caught in adultery).
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grants for faculty and graduate students, or indirectly in the
forms of Pell grants and guaranteed student loans for tuition.161
Such an approach, albeit not identical, arose shortly after the
Supreme Court ruled in Windsor and Hollingsworth. President
Obama had issued an Executive Order barring federal
contractors, including those working with religious institutions,
from what it describes as “discrimination” based on sexual
orientation and gender identity.162 Insofar as the President
ignored pleas to include a good-faith exception for bona fide
occupational qualifications such as under Title VII, the Order
raises a potential conundrum for employers in faith-based
educational institutions.163
In a state context, the City Council in Washington, D.C.
unanimously passed a law which threatens religious freedom
by a thirteen-to-nothing vote on December 2, 2014.164 This law
repealed the sexual orientation discrimination exemption
previously available to faith-based schools. The mayor signed
the Human Rights Amendment Act of 2014 into law on
January 25, 2015,165 even as critics asked Congress to
intervene, decrying its potential to limit religious freedom.166
This law revokes religious liberty protections Congress enacted
in the Nation’s Capital Religious Liberty and Academic
Freedom Act.167 Under the new law, “the term ‘human rights
161
See, e.g., Alternative to student loans, but no replacement, MT. VERNON REG.NEWS
(Ill.)
(July
31,
2015,
6:00
AM),
http://www.register-news.com/
opinion/alternative-to-student-loans-but-no-replacement/article_02918f9a-b735-5fb0a26c-ac95d3f2a323.html (discussing the impact of alternatives on schools such as
“Gordon College, a Christian school in Massachusetts that was at risk of losing
its accreditation because the college opposes ‘homosexual practice.’”).
162
79
Fed.
Reg.
42971
(July
21,
2014),
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2014/07/23/2014-17522/further-amendmentsto-executive-order-11478-equal-employment-opportunity-in-the-federal-government.
163
DC Repeals Religious Schools’ Exemption from Law on Homosexuality,
CATHOLICCULTURE.ORG (Dec. 5, 2014), www.catholicculture.org/news/headlines/
index.cfm?storyid=23439.
164
Id.
165
The bill can be found at Human Rights Amendment Act of 2014, D.C. Act 20605 (Jan. 25, 2015), http://lims.dccouncil.us/Download/31754/B20-0803-SignedAct.pdf.
166
Editorial: Congress Should Block Two D.C. Laws that Undermine Religious
Freedom,
CATH.
STANDARD
(D.C.)
(Feb.
27,
2015,
4:31
PM),
http://cathstan.org/Content/News/News/Article/Editorial-Congress-should-block-two-DC-laws-that-undermine-religious-freedom/2/2/6506.
167
Also known as the Armstrong Act: Pub. L. No 100–462, § 145, 102 Stat 226914 (1988), this law was enacted essentially to overturn Gay Rights Coalition v.
Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987) (en banc) (finding that officials at a Roman
Catholic University could not deny tangible benefits to members of gay student groups
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law’ means District or federal laws related to discrimination by
reason of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital
status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, gender
identity or expression, familial status, [and] family
responsibilities.”168 Although some institutions of higher
education have voluntarily invited pro-abortion speakers to
address campus gatherings in violation of Roman Catholic
Church teachings,169 the next step may well be to attempt to
require faith-based educational institutions, from elementary
schools to colleges and universities, to recognize, provide
funding for, and/ or allow the use of facilities by groups
advocating positions directly contrary to their sincerely held
religious beliefs pertaining to marriage and sexuality, refusing
to provide legal protection for those who seek to live out their
values and beliefs, regardless of the good they do in educating
children.170
As discussed throughout the second half of this article,
similar developments elsewhere present threats to religious
freedom. It is conceivable that religious schools run the risk of
having their rights trammelled if they are required to recognize
and accommodate these relationships despite their deeply and
long-held beliefs that same-sex marriage is inconsistent with
their teachings. However, some states take an opposite
approach and can use state laws to protect believers and their
institutions. For example, the governor of Michigan signed a
bill into law to “prevent faith-based agencies from having
policies forced on them that violate their religious beliefs,
on the basis of their sexual orientation.).
168
Human Rights Amendment Act of 2014 (2)(A), supra note 183.
169
Justin Petrisek, Georgetown’s Planned Parenthood Event Poses Danger to
Students, Ignores USCCB’s Warnings, CATHOLIC EDUCATION DAILY (March 10, 2016,
12:30 PM), http://www.cardinalnewmansociety.org/CatholicEducationDaily/Details
Page/tabid/102/ArticleID/4761/Georgetown%E2%80%99s-Planned-Parenthood-EventPoses-Danger-to-Students-Ignores-USCCB%E2%80%99s-Warnings.aspx (commenting
on inviting the organization’s president to speak).
170
A recent example of the threat posed to Christians emerged recently in
Georgia where the governor, bowing to pressure from the business community and gay
groups, vetoed a law that would have protected religious liberty. Jim Galloway, How
state’s movie biz has muddled ‘religious liberty’ fight, ATLANTA J. CONSTIT, March 31,
2016, at BI, 2016 WLNR 9746045. Among other provisions, the law would have
protected religious leaders who refused to perform same sex unions, institutions that
refused to hire or retain individuals who did not comport with their beliefs, and
organizations refusing to rent space to groups for events they found objectionable.
Available at http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/20152016/160915.pdf.
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which have resulted in agencies closing in Massachusetts,
Illinois, California, and Washington, D.C.”171
Third, as has already happened, credentialing agencies
have threatened faith-based colleges and universities with the
denial of accreditation if they refuse to accept same-sex unions
and the gay lifestyle as the norm despite their beliefs in
Biblical norms. For example, although Gordon College in
Massachusetts172 appears to have avoided such the loss of its
accreditation due to its stance on same-sex unions for the
present,173 similar threats are likely to emerge.174
171
Gov. Rick Snyder Signs Bills Putting Michigan Children First in Adoption,
Foster Care Practices, GOVERNOR RICK SNYDER REINVENTING MICHIGAN (June 11,
2015), http://www.michigan.gov/snyder/0%2c4668%2c7-277—356932—%2c00.html. For
a commentary on this situation, see Todd Stearns, It’s open season on people of faith in
Georgia, FOXNEWS.COM (March 28, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2016/
03/28/its-open-season-on-people-faith-in-georgia.html
172
See, e.g., Emma Green, Gay Rights May Come at the Cost of Religious
Freedom,
THE
ATLANTIC
ONLINE
(July
27,
2015),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/legal-rights-lgbt-discriminationreligious-freedom-claims/399278/ (discussing Gordon College); Paul Leighton, Gordon
Accreditation Still in ‘Good Standing’ After Evaluation, THE SALEM NEWS (May 5,
2015), http://www.salemnews.com/news/local_news/gordon-accreditation-still-in-goodstanding-after-evaluation/article_ca7a7a3e-7a37-5df6-965f-ff0cb2ce6e1c.html; Michael
Worley, My View: We Must Protect Religious Schools from Legal Threats, DESERET
NEWS (Nov. 7, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/865614952/Legalthreats-on-religious-schools.html?pg=all.
173
Kimberly Scharfenberger, Christian College Stands for Religious Freedom,
Catholic College Retaliates by Cancelling Sports Matches, CATHOLIC EDUC. DAILY (Mar.
11, 2015, 2:59 PM), http://www.cardinalnewmansociety.org/CatholicEducationDaily/
DetailsPage/tabid/102/ArticleID/4063/Christian-College-Stands-for-Religious-FreedomCatholic-College-Retaliates-by-Cancelling-Sports-Matches.aspx
(Interestingly,
a
Catholic institution in Massachusetts, Emmanuel College cancelled its athletic
schedule with Gordon after its president was one of fourteen signatories of a letter to
President Obama requesting a religious exemption from his Executive Order, supra
note 175, banning discrimination based on sexual orientation.).
174
A similar controversy originated in British Columbia, Canada, involving
Trinity Western Law School, a Christian institution, which was denied accreditation
because of its teachings on gay lifestyles and same-sex unions. See Mark A. Kellner,
Can America’s Faith-Based Law Schools Restrict Sexual Activity to Heterosexual
Marriage?,
DESERET
NEWS
(Feb.
15,
2015),
http://national.deseretnews.com/article/3420/can-americas-faith-based-law-schoolsrestrict-sexual-activity-to-heterosexual-marriage.html (addressing, in part, the travails
of Trinity Western, noting that the “Nova Scotia Supreme Court declare[d] the
province’s barristers’ society could not refuse to license graduates of
Trinity Western’s law school because it didn’t like the school’s covenant”); Ian Mulgrew,
TWU Covenant not Unlawful, Nova Scotia Judge Rules in Law School Case,
VANCOUVER
SUN
(Jan.
28,
2015),
http://www.vancouversun.com/story_print.html?id=10768570&sponsor=.=; Hank Jager,
Are
They
Hypocrites?,
KITCHENER-WATERLOO
REC.
(Nov.
27,
2014),
http://www.therecord.com/opinion-story/5157738-are-they-hypocrites-/ (indicating that
British Columbia, Ontario, and Nova Scotia refused to recognize Trinity Western
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Fourth, consistent with the outcome in Christian Legal
Society, college and university officials, along with student
organizations on campuses,175 have sought to deny access
and/or recognition to Christian groups. While university
officials subsequently reversed course and allowed faith-based
student groups to retain the religious requirements for their
leaders at Tufts,176 similar controversies are likely to continue.
Earlier in the year, fourteen out of thirty Christians at
Vanderbilt University stated that that they would leave
campus over the same issue,177 rather than comply with its
“policy require[ing] Christian and other religious organizations
receiving student fees to drop policies banning gays or other
members who are outside the organizations’ core beliefs.178 The
Vanderbilt policy prompted members of Congress to ask
officials to exempt faith-based organizations from the
institutional “all-comers policy” on the basis that it
discriminates against religious beliefs.179 In response, the
legislatures in Idaho,180 North Carolina,181 Ohio,182 Tennessee,183
graduates); Law Society Council Upholds Trinity Western Accreditation, CBC NEWS
WORLDWIDE (Jan. 9, 2015, 9:13 AM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newbrunswick/law-society-council-upholds-trinity-western-accreditation-1.2895025
(reporting that law graduates of Trinity Western would be allowed to practice in New
Brunswick); Mark Jaskela, TWU Ruling Shows Intolerance; Fear, Prejudice and
Slippery Ethics Behind Banning Christian Law School, VANCOUVER SUN, Dec. 19,
2014, at B9, 2014 WLNR 35965146 (reporting that British Columbia revoked the
school’s accreditation).
175
See Katherine Landergan, Group of Evangelicals at Tufts Fights a ‘Derecognizing’ Effort, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 27, 2012, 2012 WLNR 22802278 (reporting on
efforts to de-recognize an evangelical student group because opponents objected to its
religious views).
176
Peter Schworm, Tufts Shifts Course, Grants More Leeway to Student
Religious Groups, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 7, 2012, 2012 WLNR 26033344.
177
Elizabeth Bewley, Members of Congress Target Vanderbilt Policy,
TENNESSEAN, May 8, 2012, 2012 WLNR 9663350.
178
Andy Sher, Social Issues Stole the Spotlight This Year in the Tennessee
Legislature,
TIMES
FREE
PRESS
(May
6,
2012),
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/news/story/2012/may/06/a1-social-issues-stolespotlight-in-legislature-tn/77238/.
179
Elizabeth Bewley, Members of Congress Target Vanderbilt Policy,
TENNESSEAN, May 8, 2012, 2012 WLNR 9663350 (reporting that the legislature of
Tennessee enacted a law designed to ban all-comers policies, allowing campus groups
to grant membership only to those who share their beliefs and missions).
180
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33–107D (2015) (Campus access for religious students).
181
Student Organizations/Rights & Recognition, 2014 N.C. Sess. Laws 28,
SSBS. 719 (Student organizations/ rights and recognition), Senate Bill 719 / S.L. 201428.
182
OHIO. REV. CODE ANN. § 3345.023 (2011) (Religious student group benefits).
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and Virginia184 have acted to protect religious freedom by
banning discrimination by officials in public institutions
against faith-based student organizations.185
The fifth question is already playing itself out in faithbased schools when same-sex couples seek to enroll their
children in these institutions.186 When these incidents occur,
one cannot help but to wonder why same-sex marriage activists
seem to be singling out Christian schools, particularly if the
parents are openly living in violation of church teachings, and
businesses, when there are undoubtedly others who would
readily make their services available without controversy.
A sixth development raising potential dire consequences for
religious institutions involves the actions of Southern Mutual
Life Insurance Company, a firm which provides coverage to
“more than 8,400 churches.”187 The company’s vice president of
183
TENN. CODE. ANN. § 49-6-1805 (2015) (Religious student groups; access to
school facilities).
184
VA. CODE ANN. § 23-9.2:12 (2015) (Student organizations; rights and
recognition). See also Va. Passes Ban on Campus ‘All-Comers’ Policy, CBN NEWS (Feb.
26, 2013), http://www.cbn.com/cbnnews/us/2013/February/Va-Passes-Ban-on-CampusAll-Comers-Policy/ (reporting that lawmakers in Virginia enacted a law designed to
ban all-comers policies, allowing campus groups to limit membership to those who
share their beliefs and missions).
185
For coverage of this issue, see Harry Painter, The Supreme Court
Endangered Christian Student Groups, but Some States are Coming to the Rescue,
JOHN
WILLIAM
POPE
CTR.
POLICY
(Oct.
1,
2014),
http://www.popecenter.org/commentaries/article.html?id=3077#.VFVEYfnF93U.
186
See, e.g., Dave Bohon, Homosexual Couple Sues Christian Preschool for
Rejecting
Son
as
Student,
NEW
AMERICAN
(Dec.
24,
2012),
http://www.thenewamerican.com/culture/faith-and-morals/item/14013-homosexualcouple-sues-christian-preschool-for-rejecting-son-as-student; Erica Meltzer, Denver
Archbishop Defends Sacred Heart of Jesus’ Decision on Lesbians’ Children at Boulder
Preschool,
DAILY
CAMERA
(Mar.
13,
2010,
10:52
PM),
http://www.dailycamera.com/ci_14640646; Lisa Wangsness, O’Malley Post Cites “Good
of the Child”: Cardinal Backs Hingham Catholic School Decision, Offers to Help Gay
Couple,
BOSTON
GLOBE
(May
20,
2010),
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/05/20/omalley_post_cite
s_good_of_the_child/. See also Charlie Danaher, Tolerance Goes Both Ways, DAILY
CAMERA (Mar. 13, 2010, 1:00 AM), http://www.dailycamera.com/ci_14665405; Electra
Draper, Denver Archbishop Chaput’s Right-eous Stands, DENVER POST (May 21, 2010,
1:00 AM), http://www.denverpost.com/news/frontpage/ci_15130873 (concerning a
dispute in Colorado. Bishop Chaput has since been named Roman Catholic Archbishop
of the Philadelphia Archdiocese, see http://archphila.org).
187
Henry Stern, SSM & Church Insurance, INSUREBLOG (July 13, 2015, 9:30
AM),
http://insureblog.blogspot.com/2015/07/ssm-church-insurance.html
(quoting
Kemberlee Kay, Churches Refusing to Perform Same Sex Marriages may be Denied
Liability Insurance, LEGAL INSURRECTION (July 10, 2015, 1:25 PM),
http://legalinsurrection.com/2015/07/churches-refusing-to-perform-same-sex-marriagesmay-be-denied-liability-insurance/).
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underwriting sent a memorandum to clients informing them
that the firm would not provide liability insurance if they are
sued for refusing to permit same-sex ceremonies to be
performed on their premises because their actions would be in
violation of the law; refusals of coverage would also likely not
provide coverage for fines and related legal costs. To the extent
that the owners of private wedding chapels188 and other
businesses189 such as bakers,190 photographers,191 trolley
companies,192 and other businesses ceased operations rather
than transgress their faith this suggests that faith-based
educational institutions may well face the same draconian
alternatives. Put another way, faith-based schools may be
188
For one such incident, see Keith Cousins, Judge Hears Hitching Post Case,
COEUR
D’ALENE
PRESS
(July
21,
2015),
http://www.cdapress.com/news/
local_news/article_7094264b-659d-5a65-a271-51073b4c02bb.html (reporting on a suit
filed by the owners of a wedding chapel who are allegedly being forced to violate their
religious beliefs by performing ceremonies for same-sex couples in light of the city’s
anti-discrimination ordinance even though they argued that they are entitled to an
exemption because they are a religious corporation). See also Tim Rohwer, Huckabee:
U.S. Supreme Court Should Have Term Limits, DAILY NONPAREIL (July 2, 2015),
http://www.nonpareilonline.com/news/local/huckabee-u-s-supreme-court-should-haveterm-limits/article_e45d1171-b185-5dcf-99d8-34ac2efa3c59.html (including a report
that a couple had to close its wedding chapel rather than be subject to fines for refusing
to perform services for same-sex couples).
189
See Bob Ellis, Homosexual Activists Driving Store Out of Business, AMERICAN
CLARION (Dec. 7, 2012), http://www.americanclarion.com/2012/12/07/homosexualactivists-driving-store-out-of-business-15186/ (also reporting that a Catholic priest who
“was investigated by the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) for the ‘crime’
of teaching what the Bible says about homosexual behavior (that it is a sin) and
marriage (that it is between a man and a woman).”).
190
See, e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 2015 WL 4760453 (Colo. Ct. App.
2015) (upholding a fine against the owner of a bakery for refusing to provide a cake for
a same-sex union even though the initial filing in the case by the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission did not name the owner and cited the wrong portion of state law; the court
applied the “relation back” doctrine to justify its action.). See also Mark Hemmingway,
Free to Shut Up: The Collision of Religious Liberty and Gay Rights in Oregon, THE
WEEKLY STANDARD (July 20, 2015), http://www.weeklystandard.com/free-to-shutup/article/988096 (reporting on the $130,000 fine imposed on a bakery for refusing to
provide a wedding cake for a same-sex couple)
191
Elane Photography v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 U.S.
1789 (2014) (affirming that a photographer’s refusal to provide her professional
services at a same-sex commitment ceremony because doing so would have violated her
deeply held religious beliefs discriminated against the customer on the basis of sexual
orientation in violation of state law).
192
Erin Cox, It’s Back to the Bam for Wedding Trolleys, THE BALT. SUN, Dec. 26,
2012, at A1, 2012 WLNR 27914985 (reporting that the owner of a company whose
trolleys were used in marriage festivities chose to forgo what had been a profitable
business activity and shut down operations rather than run the risk of having to serve
same-sex couples in the wake of a recently approved change in state law legalizing
such relationships).
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charged with discrimination if the refuse to violate their long,
deeply-held religious belief in marriage as being between one
man and one woman or being subjected to legal sanctions if
they refuse to permit their facilities to be used in a manner
with which they disagree.
IV. RESPONSES TO INSTITUTIONAL CONCERNS
Following Obergefell, faith-based educational institutions
that face the threat of the potential loss of their tax exempt
status, among other penalties, may very well be unable to
continue to operate without such assistance because this would
have such a negative impact on their finances, thereby
harming untold numbers of students, clients, and their
employees. Obergefell might also render persons of faith subject
to vilification for remaining true to their religious beliefs. As
such, leaders in faith-based institutions, believers, and all
people of good faith (even if they are non-believers), working in
conjunction with their attorneys to protect their First
Amendment rights to freedom of religion, may wish to ponder
the following five options.
First, in the wake of Obergefell, and the threats to faithbased educational institutions and their employees just
reviewed, a measure of judicial relief could be on the horizon in
Agency for International Development v. Alliance for Open
Society International, Inc. (“Alliance”).193 In Alliance, the
Supreme Court enunciated the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine.194 Pursuant to this doctrine, the constitutionality of a
condition for receiving a subsidy, or in terms more applicable to
religious institutions such as schools, tax exemptions for
themselves and tax deductions for donors, depends on whether
the condition(s) imposed by the government define or reach
outside of a program. In other words, the “government may
impose conditions that define the limits of the particular
program, [but] may not impose” conditions that reach outside
the program.195 While, in theory, this means that faith-based
Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321 (2013).
Id. at 2327.
195
For discussions of this concept, see William E. Thro, The Limits of Christian
Legal
Society,
2014
CARDOZO
L.
REV.
124,
127
(2014),
http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/denovo/Thro_2014_35.pdf. See also William
E. Thro, Undermining Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 295 EDUC. L. REP. 867
193
194
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institutions should be able to preserve their freedom of religion,
it seems doubtful that the majority from Obergefell would be
willing to apply Alliance insofar as they have already
demonstrated their unwillingness to respect the deeply held
religious beliefs of those who disagree with their dictates.
Concomitantly, the seemingly irreconcilable difference
between Alliance, which limits the imposition of governmental
conditions on the receipt of aid, and Bob Jones, which denied
tax exempt status to institutions engaged in discriminatory
practices based on race, needs to be addressed. In other words,
there is a need for federal statutory intervention (addressed in
the following paragraph), or additional litigation, to clarify the
rights of faith-based institutions when confronted by legal
compulsions to violate their long-held sincere beliefs or risk the
loss of aid by being charged with discrimination in violation of
the law.
Second, in an attempt to ward off progressive intolerance
against faith-based institutions and individuals whose religious
beliefs adhere to the millennia-old definition of marriage as
being between one man and one woman, perhaps the best
alternative to protect religious freedom is an act of Congress.
To this end, Republican Mike Lee of Utah authored a bill he
introduced in the Senate,196 joined by Republican Congressman
Raul Labrador of Idaho and others in the House of
Representatives.197 In the hope of enacting the First
Amendment Defense Act (FADA)198 by mid-July, 115
Republicans199 signed on as co-sponsors of the proposed bill.
(2013).
196
S. 1598, “To prevent discriminatory treatment of any person on the basis of
views held with respect to marriage,” was introduced in the 1st session of the Senate in
the 114th Congress on June 17, 2015, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114thcongress/senate-bill/1598/text.
197
H.R. RES. 399, “Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that
the House should consider legislation to protect traditional marriage and prevent
taxpayer funding of abortion,” was introduced in the 1st session of the Senate in the
114th Congress on July 29, 2015. Earlier, H.R. 2802, “To prevent discriminatory
treatment of any person on the basis of views held with respect to marriage,” was
introduced in the 1st session of the House in the 114th Congress on June 17, 2015.
198
Walsh, supra note 9 (pointing out that the proposed FADA introduced by
Senator Mike Lee and Representative Raul Labrador seeks to ensure that the federal
government does not discriminate against Americans of faith based on their religious
beliefs and practices concerning marriage).
199
See also Scott Wong, ‘Religious Freedom’ Bill Picks up Momentum in House,
THE HILL (July 12, 2015), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/247599-religiousfreedom-bill-picks-up-momentum.
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Aimed at safeguarding religious liberty, the FADA would
offer broad-based protection to persons of faith as it attempts to
forge something of a compromise between those whose views on
marriage differ radically. On the one hand, the FADA does not
question or attack the holding in Obergefell. On the other hand,
the FADA would prevent the federal government from
discriminating against people of faith, and others, who believe
that marriage is a relationship between one man and one
woman. Interestingly, this language seems to reflect Justice
Kennedy’s attempt to allay the concerns of believers about the
future of religious freedom.200
After citing its proposed law’s short title201 and findings,202
FADA sets forth its key provisions.203 The remaining sections of
the FADA address judicial relief,204 rules of construction,205 and
See supra notes 79, 114 and accompanying text.
H.R. 2802 was introduced in the 1st session of the House in the 114th
Congress on June 17, 2015, § 1. S 1598, which is identical, was introduced in Senate on
the same day, June 17, 2015.
202
Id. § 2.
203
Id. § 3. It reads,
200
201

SEC. 3. PROTECTION OF THE FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND
MORAL CONVICTIONS.
(a) In General.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Federal
Government shall not take any discriminatory action against a person, wholly or
partially on the basis that such person believes or acts in accordance with a
religious belief or moral conviction that marriage is or should be recognized as the
union of one man and one woman, or that sexual relations are properly reserved to
such a marriage.
(b) Discriminatory Action Defined.—As used in subsection (a), a discriminatory
action means any action taken by the Federal Government to—
(1) alter in any way the Federal tax treatment of, or cause any tax, penalty, or
payment to be assessed against, or deny, delay, or revoke an exemption from
taxation under section 501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 of, any person
referred to in subsection (a);
(2) disallow a deduction for Federal tax purposes of any charitable contribution
made to or by such person;
(3) withhold, reduce, exclude, terminate, or otherwise deny any Federal grant,
contract, subcontract, cooperative agreement, loan, license, certification,
accreditation, employment, or other similar position or status from or to such
person;
(4) withhold, reduce, exclude, terminate, or otherwise deny any benefit under a
Federal benefit program from or to such person; or
(5) otherwise discriminate against such person.
(c) Accreditation; Licensure; Certification.—The Federal Government shall
consider accredited, licensed, or certified for purposes of Federal law any person
that would be accredited, licensed, or certified, respectively, for such purposes but
for a determination against such person wholly or partially on the basis that the
person believes or acts in accordance with a religious belief or moral conviction
that marriage is or should be recognized as the union of one man and one woman,
or that sexual relations are properly reserved to such a marriage.
204

Id. § 4.
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definitions.206 Given the strong support of President Obama207
and most Democrats for same-sex unions,208 not to mention
activist groups209 hoping to extinguish religious liberty, the
FADA may face an uphill battle to passage.
At the same time, defenders of religious freedom should
vigorously oppose the so-called Equality Act, co-sponsored by
more than 160 democrat members of the House,210 filed less
than a month after Obergefell was handed down. The
innocuous sounding title of this proposed law aside, it would
present a range of risks to religious freedom. Among its
provisions, this law would create new classifications protecting
“sexual orientation” and “gender identity” while not affording
exemptions for faith-based organizations that define marriage
as being between one man and one woman rooted in their longheld sincere religious beliefs. In addition, this law would deny
religious organizations exemptions contained in the proposed
Employment Non-Discrimination Act,211 adding that the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)212 cannot be used as
Id. § 5.
Id. § 6.
207
See, e.g., Felicia Sonmez, Barack Obama: ‘The First Gay President’?
Newsweek
Bestows
Provocative
Title
on
Barack Obama After
he
Shows Support for Same-Sex Marriage, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, May 15, 2012, 2012
WLNR
23620204;
President Obama Becomes
the
First
American
Leader
to Support Same-Sex Marriage, MONTREAL GAZETTE, May 10, 2012, at A1, 2012 WLNR
9800950.
208
See, e.g., Alex Roarty, Democrats to Officially Back Gay Marriage, NAT’L J.
ONLINE, June 30, 2012, 2012 WLNR 16364137; Democrats Back Gay Marriage, COM.
APPEAL, Aug. 10, 2012, at 3, 2012 WLNR 19252814.
209
In a development that should come as no surprise, the American Civil
Liberties Union announced that it would not defend individuals with claims under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act in disputes involving same-sex unions. See Jim
Galloway, Political Insider Blog: ACLU Disavows Support for Federal ‘Religious
Liberty’
Law,
ATLANTA
J.
CONST.
(June
29,
2015),
http://politics.blog.ajc.com/2015/06/29/aclu-disavows-support-for-federal-religiousliberty-law/.
210
This proposed Act was introduced in the House as H.R. 3185, and Senate as
S. 1858 on July 23, 2015. Without being noted as such, this bill is apparently a
successor act to The Employment Non-Discrimination Act, Employment NonDiscrimination Act of 2013, S. 815, 113th Cong. § 5(A) (2013), designed to prohibit
discrimination based on sexual orientation. For a slightly more detailed discussion of
this proposed law, see Charles J. Russo, Religious Freedom in the United States: “When
You Come to a Fork in the Road, Take It,” 38 U. DAYTON L. REV. 363 (2013) nn.223–26
and accompanying text.
211
H.R. 3185 § 1101 (2015–16).
212
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–4. But see City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)
(invalidating the RFRA as it applied to States). For representative commentaries on
this case, see Ralph D. Mawdsley, Flores v. City of Boerne: Testing the
205
206
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a defense for challenging its provisions.213
Unlike the FADA, though, which seeks to mediate the
differences between those with opposing views of marriage, the
proposed Equality Act takes on a different tenor. If anything,
the Equality Act comes across more as a declaration of the
ultimate victory for those who wish to obliterate any dissent
over the definition of marriage. Given the current make-up of
Congress, it seems that this bill is also unlikely to be adopted
at this time. Even so, the Equality Act serves as warning shot
fired across the bow of religious freedom.
Third, the role of the federal RFRA214 in conjunction with its
state statutory215 counterparts, perhaps coupled with
gubernatorial Executive Orders,216 may offer a measure of
protection to faith-based institutions and their employees in
their collective profession of the belief that marriage is between
one man and one woman. The federal RFRA, in particular, may
come into play if and when President Obama seeks to impose
Executive Orders217 implementing Obergefell in relation to
faith-based institutions, particularly schools, colleges, and
universities, because such an action may implicate the
institutions’ ability to file free exercise rights claims with a
Constitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 115 EDUC. L. REP. 593
(1997); Ruth Colker, The Supreme Court’s Historical Errors in City of Boerne v. Flores,
43 B.C. L. REV. 783 (2002).
213
Supra note 210, §223, 1107.
214
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4.
215
As of March, 2015, at least twenty states had religious freedom laws in effect.
Campbell Robertson & Richard Pérez-Peña, Bills on ‘Religious Freedom’ Upset Capitols
in
Arkansas
and
Indiana,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
31,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/us/religious-freedom-restoration-act-arkansasindiana.html?_r=0. For examples of such laws, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41–1493
to–1493.02; ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-491; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52–571b; FLA. STAT. §§
761.01–.05; IDAHO CODE §§ 73–401 to–404; 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1–99; IND. CODE
34-13-9-1 et seq.; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 466; MO. REV. STAT. §§ 1.302–307; N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 28–22–1 to 28–22–5; OKLA. STAT. Tit. 51, §§ 251–258; 71 PA. CONS. STAT. §§
2401–2407; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42–80.1–1 to–4; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1–32–10 to–60;
TENN. CODE § 4–1–407; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 110.001–012; UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 63l–5–101 to–403; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 57–1 to–2.02.
216
See, e.g., Emily Lane, Louisiana’s Religious Freedom Bill Effectively Defeated
in Committee, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 19, 2015, updated May 28, 2015),
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/05/louisianas_religious_freedom_b.html
(also reporting that Governor Bobby Jindal signed an Executive Order into effect on
May 19, 2015, to prevent the government from taking such actions as revoking licenses
and tax benefits based on the beliefs of individuals or institutions that marriage is
between one man and one woman); See also Executive Order BJ 15-8, Marriage and
Conscience Order, http://www.doa.la.gov/osr/other/bj15-8.htm.
217
See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
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reasonable chance of success on the merits. Moreover, working
together, the federal and state218 RFRAs may be able to
safeguard religious institutions by forbidding governmental
intervention, placing substantial burdens on the institutions’
rights to the free exercise of religion absent compelling state
interests that are achieved by the least restrictive means
possible.
Fourth, another possible course of action for faith-based
institutions may arise under Hosanna-Tabor, wherein the
Supreme Court unanimously upheld the right of Church
leaders rather than the EEOC to decide who qualifies as a
minister.219 More specifically, insofar as the Supreme Court
unanimously upheld the authority of religious officials to
determine who qualifies as a minister, when proponents of
same-sex unions file suits alleging discrimination because
leaders in faith-based institutions refuse to hire them or their
partners because they are not living lifestyles compatible with
their religious missions, then this case should offer a strong
defense.220
A fifth and final response available to critics of Obergefell is
emerging in the form of non-violent civil disobedience.221
Apparently, the first post-Obergefell instance of civil
disobedience arose when the county clerk in Rowan County,
Kentucky, refused to grant marriage licenses to same-sex
couples and unsuccessfully sought judicial relief based on her
sincerely held religious beliefs.222 Subsequently, a judge in
218
For a brief commentary on state RFRAs with a focus on Indiana’s statute, see
Fredrick Mark Gedicks, Public, Private, Religious? Religious Freedom Restoration Acts
in the U.S. States, QUADERNI COSTITUZIONALI, NO. 3 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2015
Forthcoming)
(cited
with
the
permission
of
the
author),
http://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=65300409409910607807401900500107109
504901703108309003506410008809600811412508902912102210209803111906301310
209808500400509807200002006608703509900710002106400502305904106700908002
9088020113125088120122082113089112100124064006017087022093099118119&EXT
=pdf.
219
Supra note 18.
220
For a commentary on point, see Charles J. Russo, Religious Freedom in a
Brave New World: How Leaders in Faith-Based Schools Can Follow their Beliefs in
Hiring, 45 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 457 (2014).
221
For a commentary on point, see Sasha Volokh, Kim Davis and the Limits of
Disobedience, WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/09/04/kim-davis-and-the-limits-of-disobedience/.
222
The trial court and Sixth Circuit orders can be found at
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Kentucky-marriage-15A250application.pdf. It should come as no surprise that Justice Kagan, a supporter of same-
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Oregon refused to perform same-sex unions by also relying on
his deeply held religious beliefs under the First Amendment.223
Further, a jurist in Tennessee denied a divorce petition in a
clear protest against Obergefell, rooted in his contention that
the Supreme Court has the duty to clarify when a marriage is
no longer a marriage before he could rule.224
The dispute over the refusal of the county clerk, Kim Davis,
to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples and subsequent
jail time225 garnered widespread media coverage. The time that
she spent in jail is a penalty now being called into question for
its severity226 as she has since been released.227 Davis was
charged with being in contempt of court because she followed
her conscience, amid ad hominem attacks on her person.228 Her
sex unions, denied the clerk’s appeal. See Davis v. Miller, 2015 WL 5097125 (2015)
(mem.).
223
Bryan Denson, Oregon Judge Refuses to Perform Same-Sex Marriages, Cites
First Amendment Right to Religious Freedom, OREGONIAN (Sept. 3, 2015),
http://www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwest-news/index.ssf/2015/09/oregon_judge_
refuses_to_perfor.html.
224
Kendi Anderson & Zack Peterson, Judge Declines Divorce Case, Citing Gay
Marriage
Ruling,
CHATTANOOGA
TIMES
(Sept.
3,
2015),
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/local/story/2015/sep/03/judge-declines-divorcecase-citing-gay-marria/323201/.
The
judge’s
order
is
available
at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/277777194/Order-Dismissing-Complaint-Counter-complaint.
According to the judge:
With the U.S. Supreme Court having defined what must be recognized as a
marriage, it would appear that Tennessee’s judiciary must now await the decision
of the U. S. Supreme Court as to what is not a marriage, or better stated, when a
marriage is no longer a marriage. The majority’s opinion in Obergefell, regardless
of its patronizing and condescending verbiage, is now the law of the land. . .

Id. at p. 4.
225
See, e.g., Kevin Truong, Kim Davis Ordered to Jail Despite 11th Hour Request
for
Stay,
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR
(Sept.
3,
2015),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2015/0903/Kim-Davis-ordered-to-jail-despite11th-hour-request-for-stay-video; Kentucky County Clerk Kim Davis Jailed for Not
Issuing Marriage Licenses, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 2, 2015, 2015 WLNR
26273879.
226
See William McGurn, Why Must Kim Davis Be Jailed? WALL ST. J. (Sept. 7,
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-must-kim-davis-be-jailed-1441666727; Ryan T.
Anderson, We don’t need Kim Davis to be in Jail, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/07/opinion/we-dont-need-kim-davis-to-be-in-jail.html?
_r=0.
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David Weigel ET AL., Kim Davis released from jail, ordered not to interfere
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same-sex
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licenses,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
8,
2015,),,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/09/08/judge-orderskentucky-clerk-kim-davis-released-from-jail/.
228
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Bus
Driver.
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Sept.
5,
2015),
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experience, no doubt, presages later criticisms of others who
stand up for their faiths. Why wiser, or at least cooler, heads
did not prevail is not clear. Nor is it clear why officials seeking
to employ the least restrictive means available to serve a
compelling government interest decided to restrict her right to
the free exercise of her religious beliefs by, for instance, having
others issue the license from the outset, something they have
since done.229 The situation is made more puzzling when it is
not clear whether the clerk’s refusal to grant licenses rises to
the level that requires the punishment of incarceration. 230
Reactions to the stance of the county clerk in Kentucky
stand in stark contrast to the silence in the face of inaction by
other public officials who refused to enforce duly enacted laws
on marriage and did not receive the same treatment.231 If
anything, silence was deafening insofar as there was a no
criticism or public outcry when “California’s Governor, attorney
general, and various other state and local officials responsible
for enforcing California’s marriage laws. Those officials refused
to defend the law”232 known as Proposition 8.
The controversy over Proposition 8, a voter-enacted ballot
initiative approved by a clear majority of citizens amending the
state Constitution of California to recognize only marriage
between a man and a woman as valid, led to its ultimate
demise in the Supreme Court’s judgment in Hollingsworth.233
Issue Same Sex Marriage Licenses as Been Married 4 Times, MEDIAITEMEDIAITE (Sept.
2, 2015, 11:40 AM), http://www.mediaite.com/online/ky-clerk-who-wont-issue-same-sexmarriage-licenses-has-been-married-4-times/.
229
Lana Bellamy, Deputy Clerks to Issue Marriage Licenses in Rowan, DAILY
INDEP. (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.dailyindependent.com/news/deputy-clerks-to-issuemarriage-licenses-in-rowan/article_4fb71d84-5291-11e5-b750-f33152fd9a18.html.
230
For a discussion of this situation, suggesting that the clerk may have a viable
claim under Kentucky’s RFRA because it exempts governmental employees unless
denying a request such as the clerk’s was the least restrictive means available to
accomplish a compelling governmental interest, see Eugene Volokh, When Does Your
Religion Legally Excuse you from Doing Part of Your Job? WASH. POST (Sept. 4, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/09/04/when-doesyour-religion-legally-excuse-you-from-doing-part-of-your-job/.
231
See, e.g., Melissa Quinn & Kate Scanlon, 10 Public Officials Who Defied the
Law
over
Gay
Marriage
Mostly
Silent
on
Kim
Davis
Case,
http://dailysignal.com/2015/09/03/10-public-officials-who-defied-the-law-over-gaymarriage-mostly-silent-on-kim-davis-case/?utm_source=heritagefoundation&utm_
medium=email&utm_campaign=morningbell&mkt_tok=3RkMMJWWfF9wsRohvazPZ
KXonjHpfsX56eUsW6%2B%2BlMI%2F0ER3fOvrPUfGjI4ATcJhMq%2BTFAwTG5tozi
V8R7jHKM1t0sEQWBHm.
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Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2660.
233
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The presence of such a clear double standard when officials
who selectively chose not to defend California’s law on
marriage did so without a word of criticism being uttered is
unlikely to change because the Supreme Court has taken sides
in the culture war. Consequently, it might behoove critics of
Obergefell to point this out constantly in the hope of educating
the public as to the threats facing religious freedom at the
hands of duplicitous critics.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States is at a fork in the road where there are
those who would limit the religious freedom of faith-based
educational institutions, their employees, and business owners
based on their long-term, sincerely held religious beliefs that
are grounded in millennia of teachings, both religious and
secular, recognizing marriage as being between one man and
one woman. Those who seek to limit religious freedom would be
wise to reflect on the words of Justice Jackson in West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette,234 wherein the Supreme
Court upheld the rights of children who were Jehovah’s
Witnesses to refrain from reciting the Pledge of Allegiance
because it violated their religious beliefs. Justice Jackson
presciently reasoned:
freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter
much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of
its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the
heart of the existing order. If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion, or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein.235

Opponents of religious liberty have staked out the
boundaries in what appears to be a looming battle royale, using
the newly discovered judicial right to same-sex unions that five
unelected Supreme Court Justices imposed on the United
States, democracy and the will of the people notwithstanding,
as their battle cry. Thus, insofar as the future of religious
freedom under the First Amendment is at stake, particularly
234
235

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
Id. at 641–42.
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as it may impact educational institutions and their employees
at all levels, it is imperative for believers and others of good
faith to join together to preserve this most precious of
American rights.
One can only hope that as issues come to a head,
individuals on both sides of the divide in the dispute over
defining marriage can live, and behave, in a manner
demonstrating respect for the dignity of each other, even those
with whom they disagree. To live this way is in line with
Voltaire’s often quoted dictum: “I disapprove of what you say,
but I will defend to the death your right to say it.”236 The battle,
it seems, is soon to be joined.

236
Cited at Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 63 (1976) (internal
citations omitted) (upholding an ordinance imposing restrictions on the locations of
theatres showing sexually explicit “adult” movies).

